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Abstract: We construct an endogenous growth model and we employ empirical 
analysis to investigate the link between foreign aid and production inefficiency in the 
presence of different political orientations in the recipient country. Using a panel of 
124 countries from 1971 to 2007 and the production frontier toolbox, controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, time horizons, the sources of aid, and the timing of aid 
impact, we document that foreign aid is associated with higher production 
inefficiency and that this inefficiency is reduced considerably if countries switch to 
democratic governance. Our study contributes to the aid literature by pointing to the 
institutional enhancement of the recipient countries through the adoption of 
democratic ruling practices. 
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1. Introduction 
Much of the recent literature on foreign aid has focused on its effectiveness in 
facilitating economic growth for recipient countries.1 Yet, this literature is far from 
conclusive with recent studies arguing in favour of no effect at all.2 None, however, 
has examined the indirect effects of aid that −although do not appear in per capita 
economic growth− are important elements of its effectiveness. Instead of looking at 
the direct impact of foreign aid on growth we look at the production inefficiency 
reduction in the presence of foreign aid. Since foreign aid is managed by the ruling 
class within a certain political environment, it is interesting to see if, in addition, there 
are differential effects conditional on this environment.3
This paper uses a theoretical model and employs panel data techniques to answer a 
simple question: what is the impact of foreign aid on the production inefficiency of 
the recipient country conditional on its political governance. We define inefficiency as 
the distance between the actual production and its potential level given the available 
input resources and technology. If foreign aid is asymmetrically beneficial to any 
production input and total factor productivity conditional on political governance, we 
should observe a reduction in production inefficiency during democratic years. 
Seeking to reveal the interactive effects of foreign aid and democracy on production 
inefficiency, we test the following proposition which is derived from the aid-growth 
and the democracy-growth literature: foreign aid will foster production efficiency in 
democracies but not in autocracies; in other words, aid will be used inefficiently and 
consequently reduce productivity in autocracies.  
  
To empirically investigate whether foreign aid is associated with reductions in 
production inefficiency we initially examine a sample of 124 bilateral and/or 
multilateral aid recipients for the period 1971-2007. We then assess if this inefficiency 
effect differs before and after incidents of permanent democratization during the Third 
Wave of democratization and the 1990s. The panel results reveal some novel 
evidence. First, controlling for time-invariant, country-specific characteristics and 
global shocks, an increase of foreign aid by 1% increases production inefficiency by 
0.7%. This effect, however, cancels out by an opposite positive efficiency effect of 
                                                          
 
 
1
 For detailed reviews and evidence see Kanbur (2006), Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008), and 
the papers cited therein. 
2
 See, for example, Boone (1996) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008). 
3
 To this end, we separate countries into two broad categories: democracies and autocracies.  
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foreign aid during democratic years when aid shows to reduce inefficiency by 
approximately the same magnitude. Second, although the direct effect of aid on 
inefficiency is positive, there is evidence of an inverted U-shaped negative 
inefficiency effect when aid interacts with democracy; early before countries switch to 
democratic rule aid has a strong effect on inefficiency reduction which diminishes 
significantly by the 4th, 5th and 6th year after democratization to pick up again 
afterwards. Third, we find that moderate but stable political changes towards 
democracy bolster production inefficiency reductions more than abrupt political 
transitions. 
We are not aware of any other paper that studies directly the link between foreign 
aid and production inefficiency. The closest study to ours is that of Rajan and 
Subramanian (2010) which show that aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a 
country’s competitiveness, as reflected in a decline in the share of labour intensive 
and tradable industries in the manufacturing sector. They also show that these effects 
stem from the real exchange rate overvaluation caused by aid inflows. By contrast, 
private-to-private flows like remittances do not seem to create these adverse effects. 
Our analysis departs from this study in three distinctive ways: (i) we associate directly 
foreign aid with production inefficiency, (ii) we provide a theoretical framework to 
explain how foreign aid affects total production inefficiency abstracting from factor 
specific shares and prices, and (iii) we link foreign aid and production inefficiency to 
the political orientation of recipients. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an extended 
review of the related literature and outlines the theoretical arguments of the key 
relationships. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework of aid effectiveness and 
section 4 provides the empirical methodology. Section 5 describes the dataset at hand 
and reports the benchmark empirical results. Section 6 presents and discusses the 
main empirical findings and finally section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Ample empirical literature on the cross-country aid-growth nexus using different time 
horizons, channels and methodologies has reported very poor results so far, most of 
them conditional on various but specific aspects of aid. Burnside and Dollar (2000), 
for example, show that the growth impact of aid is conditional on the quality of 
economic policy. Hansen and Tarp (2001) examine the relationship in a panel 
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framework and Dalgaar et al. (2004) focus on the geography of aid allocations. 
Clemens et al. (2004) argue that disaggregating aid is important and find evidence of a 
positive, causal relationship between “short-impact” aid and economic growth 
regardless of the recipient’s financial or institutional environment.4
Recent theoretical and empirical literature has emphasized the role of institutions 
in the economic performance of countries.
 Finally, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) show that a comprehensive examination of the aid-growth nexus, 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, different empirical model 
specifications, time horizons, the sources of aid and the timing of aid impact, leaves 
no room for a robust statistical relationship between aid and growth.  
5
 Several empirical studies have shown that 
the most important institutional change of a country, that of democratization, asserts a 
positive effect in long-run growth under certain conditions.6
As a theoretical argument of the aforementioned differential effect of aid one can 
assert that political contestation and institutional constraints inherent in a democracy 
not only prevent its leaders from predating on the society but also force them to 
allocate resources –like aid– efficiently on an egalitarian basis. Angeles and Neanidis 
(2009) show that the type of the local elite matters for the use of foreign aid but the 
authors don’t associate this type with the political regime of the country. We do this in 
the present study by matching the behavior of the local elites with the political 
orientation of the state alongside foreign aid usage.  
 Yet, there is little, if any, 
attention on the link between this major institutional change and the way foreign aid is 
distributed, monitored and used in the recipient countries. Although there is evidence 
that democratization leads to more foreign aid (see, for example, Alesina and Dollar, 
2000), no one has so far investigated comprehensively the effect of aid on production 
efficiency under different political regimes. A joint look at both fields is the 
innovation of the present study.  
More specifically, autocratic rulers tend to misuse state resources for political 
reasons at the expense of investment and long-run growth and they are more inclined 
to provide private benefits to political opponents rather than public goods to citizens, 
                                                          
 
 
4
 In their analysis “short-impact” aid includes budget and balance of payments support, 
investments in infrastructure, and aid for productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. 
5
 For a review see Acemoglu et al. (2005). 
6
 See for example Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) and Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005). 
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as such an allocation better serves their desire to stay in office (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al., 2001). This incentive of “rational self-interested dictators” is even stronger when 
their time horizon is relatively short (Olson, 1993; Wright, 2008). On the other hand, 
in democracies where the winning coalition becomes large relative to the electorate 
and political contestation is more intense, political leaders have to provide sufficient 
public goods as a means of securing popular support and political survival. In this 
sense, democratic leaders are more pressured to distribute state resources, like foreign 
aid, effectively and equally for the public rather than use it to favour a small minority 
of the population. In turn, more equal distribution of foreign aid helps citizens accrue 
precious capital and motivate them to invest for growth. Following this rationale, one 
would expect increased aid effectiveness in more democratic recipients.   
However, from the extant literature one can also derive the opposite hypothesis: 
foreign aid may depress growth in democracies rather than in autocracies. The main 
reason is that democracies of established participatory rights and civil liberties face 
enormous public pressure for immediate state expenditure and equal resource 
distribution, voiced easily by strong interest groups via formal channels (Huntington, 
1968; Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Przeworski et al., 
2000). Yet, economic theory teaches us that sustained growth requires increased 
accumulation of capital for future investment along with decreased current 
consumption. In essence, while democratic governments tend to satisfy voters’ 
demands for current consumption at the expense of long-term growth, autocratic 
leaders of long time horizons and less political contestation have the nearly absolute 
state autonomy to use aid resources in order to pursue rapid economic development 
(Olson, 1982; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). Taken these arguments together, it 
becomes clear that whether foreign aid will stall or promote growth in the recipient 
country depends crucially on the political environment of the recipient and the time 
horizon of the ruling regime. In the following sections we develop a simple theoretical 
model to describe the channels of aid effectiveness and we employ econometric 
analysis to empirically test the model predictions. 
 
3. A theoretical model of production efficiency and aid   
Production efficiency and technological progress are the two components of total 
factor productivity (Grosskopf, 1993). Production efficiency is of great importance for 
aid-recipient countries as, in the majority of them, technological progress is very slow. 
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While by technological progress we mean the expansion of the set of production 
possibilities, an increase in production efficiency is synonymous to a more efficient 
use of the existing production inputs and corresponds to a convergence towards the 
production frontier. The production frontier thus refers to the maximum technically 
feasible output attainable from a given set of production factors. 
Following Drine and Nabi (2010) we construct an endogenous growth model of a 
closed aid-recipient economy to describe how foreign aid affects domestic production 
efficiency. A key feature of the model is the realistic hypothesis that a part of the 
economy’s output is produced in the informal sector.7
Foreign aid is provided by donors directly to the local government of the recipient 
country and is subject to misuse the extent of which depends on the government’s 
policy; the government provides a part of it to co-finance the formal investment 
projects of the economy and keeps the rest for own purposes. Foreign aid for 
investment co-financing poses an incentive for investors to engage in the efficient 
formal sector as it increases profits. The resulting shrinkage of the share of informal 
sector is actually the mechanism through which foreign aid affects production 
efficiency in the recipient economy. However, we assume that the profits of the 
formal sector are subject to expropriation. By expropriation we mean any event that 
abridges an investment, for instance acts of the government, such as actual 
expropriation, capital levies, unexpected export or excise taxes, ownership risk due to 
low protection of property rights, theft by private parties and actions by capricious or 
ineffective courts. Investors of the informal sector do not suffer such losses, but have 
to pay some cost of informality. Intuitively, investors’ decisions determine the relative 
 This sector is widely accepted 
to be less efficient than the formal one (Loayza, 1997; Johnson et al., 1997; Schneider 
and Enste, 2000) due to non-exploitation of economies of scale (Ferreira-Tiryaki, 
2008) and due to no access to financial markets (Lubell, 1991). The relative size of 
the informal sector determines the production efficiency of the economy. Investors of 
the economy have two choices: invest in the formal sector or the less efficient 
informal one.  
                                                          
 
 
7
 For the majority of developing countries, the informal sector produces between 20% and 
40% of GDP (Chickering and Salahdine, 1991), with its size being approximately 68% in 
Egypt, 39% in Malaysia, 76% in Nigeria, 71% in Thailand and 45% in Tunisia (Friedman et 
al., 2000). 
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size of the informal sector and, eventually, the production efficiency of the economy. 
Finally, to the extent that both aid misuse and investment expropriation risks −that 
affect investors’ decisions− are associated with the political environment and the 
institutional framework of the recipient country, we expect foreign aid to affect 
production efficiency differently in each country, depending on the existing domestic 
conditions.    
We consider an economy of overlapping generations with an infinite, discrete time 
horizon, 0,1,2...t =
 
The economy produces a consumption good using capital and 
labour and an investment (or capital) good using the consumption good. At each date 
a new generation of two-period living agents of mass 1 is born. The old of the first 
generation are endowed with a stock k0 of capital good. Agents are endowed with one 
unit of labour which they supply inelastically and at no disutility cost to the 
consumption good sector during their first period of life and receive a wage which 
they invest during their second period of life in order to maximize final consumption.8
 
 
Thus, labour supply is L=1 in each period. Old agents face a tradeoff when choosing 
between a formal and an informal project: On the one hand, a formal project is 
eligible for a complementary subsidy financed by aid, but generated profits are subject 
to expropriation. The informal project, on the other hand, cannot be expropriated but 
is self-financed and involves some informality cost. 
3.1. Consumption good sector 
The consumption good is produced out of capital K and labour L and is tradable. We 
assume a Cobb–Douglas production function of constant returns of the form 
1 a
t t t tY A K L
α −= .          (1) 
If we set, for simplicity, the aggregate level of “knowledge” At equal to the aggregate 
stock of capital ( )11 / −−= = aat t t tA Ak A K L , then the production of the consumption 
good corresponds to the capital stock t tY AK=  and per capita output is given by  
t ty Ak= .          (2) 
                                                          
 
 
8
 For simplicity, we assume that consumption occurs only at the end of the second period. 
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Generated output is entirely distributed to workers and to investment good producers. 
The factors’ prices are equal to their marginal productivity and capital depreciates 
fully after production. Assuming further that A=1, we can write the price of capital 
and labour respectively: 
=t aρ
           
(3) 
( )1= −t tw kα .         (4) 
 
3.2. Capital good sector 
Old agents make their investment decision on a profit-maximization basis taking into 
account the following: Any capital good, regardless of its type, is produced using a 
linear technology of the form bqt, where b>1 and qt denotes the quantity of the 
consumption good used in production. A formal project is eligible to a complementary 
subsidy ftd
 
in terms of the consumption good. This subsidy is financed by aid and 
increases the amount of the consumption good invested in the formal project (qt) to 
f
t tw d+  and the quantity of the capital good produced to 
( )1f ft t tk b w d+ = + .
         
(5) 
Undertaking a formal project provides the agent an income 1ftak +  in terms of the 
consumption good where a is the unit price of the capital produced. Assuming, for 
simplicity, zero production cost, the generated income stands for the agent’s profits 
and since the latter are subject to expropriation 0 1tτ≤ ≤ , then the agent’s net profit 
from the formal project is  
( ) ( )1 1f ft t t tab w dπ τ+ = − + .
        
(6) 
The alternative choice of the agent is to undertake an informal project. This 
investment is self-financed but profits are not subject to expropriation. Thus, the 
technology here is  
1
j
t tk bw+ = .           (7) 
Moreover, informal projects involve some cost of informality 1jtc +  which reduces the 
agent’s net profit to ( )1 1 1j j jt t ta k cπ + + += − , assuming again zero production cost. This 
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informality cost includes, for instance, bribes that enable the masking of the activity 
or high transport costs due to distant firm localization and is assumed to vary across 
agents and production level, ( )1 11j jt j tc kθ+ += − , where the parameter θj is agent-specific 
and is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Therefore, we can write the agent’s net profit 
from the informal project as 
( )1 1 1j j jt t t j ta k c a bwπ θ+ + += − = .         (8) 
Each agent chooses the project that maximizes his net profit. Hence, at date t the 
condition for choosing the informal project is 1 1j ft tπ π+ +≥  and the set of informal 
entrepreneurs is Θ={j such that [ ,1]j tθ θ∈ },
 
where tθ  is defined by 
( )1 1 1f ft tt t
t t
d
abw w
πθ τ+  = = − +   . 
       
(9) 
The set Θ  of formal entrepreneurs includes agents who support sufficiently high cost 
of informality and for whom it is more interesting to undertake formal projects 
{ jΘ =
 such that [0, ]}j tθ θ . Notice that θt and 1−θt correspond to the share of the 
formal and the informal sector respectively ( 0 1j≤ ≤θ ). As expected, the share of the 
formal sector increases as the ratio of the investment subsidy to wage increases and as 
the expropriation risk decreases. The intuition is simple; agents will be encouraged to 
invest in the efficient formal sector as the projects co-financing increases and as the 
profits of the sector become more secured.  
 
3.3. Government 
In each period t the country receives an amount dt of foreign aid per capita through the 
local government. The government is responsible for the management of aid and 
controls its allocation in the economy. Depending on the nature of the government, 
foreign aid is subject to misuse. The government allocates a proportion 0 1tλ≤ ≤
 
to 
self-interest purposes and a proportion 1−λt to co-finance the formal investment 
projects. Thus, foreign aid per capita to the efficient formal sector equals 
( )1ft t td dλ= − .
 
(10) 
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The extent of aid misuse λt depends on the institutional framework of the recipient 
country and the political environment. 
 
3.4. The size of the formal sector and the role of aid 
In this section we relate the relative size of the efficient formal sector with foreign aid. 
This relationship is the mechanism through which aid affects production efficiency 
because, as we will see below, production efficiency is a positive function of the share 
of the formal sector. Using (9) and (10) the share of the formal sector can be written: 
( ) ( )11 1 − = − +  
t t
t t
t
d
w
λθ τ .
 
(11) 
Differentiating (11) with respect to aid per capita we easily obtain 
( )( ) 11 1 0t t
t td w
θ τ λ∂ = − − ≥∂ . (12) 
Interestingly, an increase in aid per capita increases the share of the efficient formal 
sector in the economy. However, the magnitude of this effect depends negatively on 
two closely related factors; the first one is the expropriation risk, implying that in a 
hostile economic and institutional environment foreign aid will result in an enlarging 
of the formal sector, the magnitude of which will be nevertheless small compared to 
what would be the case in a more favorable environment. The second factor is the 
extent of aid misuse; the greater the mismanagement of aid, the smaller the increase of 
the formal sector as a result of aid receipts. The economic implications of these 
relationships are recovered in the next section where we model production efficiency. 
 
3.5. Production efficiency and foreign aid 
Production efficiency is defined, at each period, as the ratio of the actual output per 
capita to the potential output per capita. Thus, production efficiency of period t+1 can 
be written 
1
1
1
t
t
t
y
y
φ ++
+
= . (13) 
From (2) and (13) it follows that 1 1 1/t t tk kφ + + += , i.e. the production efficiency of the 
economy corresponds to the efficiency of the capital good production process. The 
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quantity of the capital good available at t+1 is the sum of the output of the formal 
sector 1
f
t tkθ +
 
and that of the informal sector ( )1 1
t
j
j t ik d
θ
θ θ+∫ . By substitution from (5), (7) 
and (10) we obtain  
( )( ) ( ) ( )11 , ,
t
f
t t t t j t i t t tk b w d bw d bw h
θ
θ θ θ θ λ+ = + + =∫  (14) 
where ( ) ( ) 21 1, 1
2
t t t
t t t
t
d
h
w
λ θθ λ θ −  −= + +   . (15) 
As expected, production efficiency is a positive function of the share of the formal 
sector and a negative function of the extent of aid misuse. Moreover, from (12), (14) 
and (15) we can recover the marginal effect of aid on production efficiency  
( )( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 0t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t
d k k bw z z d
dd d d
φ θ τ τθ
+ + +∂ ∂ ∂= + = − + + ≥∂ ∂ ∂  (16) 
where ( )1 tt
t
z
w
λ−= .  
Evidently, the efficiency effect of aid is not uniform but rather depends negatively on 
the expropriation risk and the extent of aid misuse. Notice, however that both factors 
are indicators of political governance and institutional quality in the recipient 
countries. This means that, to the extent that democratic ruling is linked to better 
institutions and greater political accountability, we expect aid to encourage formal 
investment activities and, consequently, production efficiency in democracies and not 
in autocracies (λt=1). We can thus derive the following testable prediction: 
 
The efficiency effect of aid depends on the political environment of the recipient 
country with democratic countries enjoying production efficiency as a result of aid. 
 
4. Empirical methodology 
In this section we describe the empirical methodology we employ to test the 
theoretical prediction. Let the production function be written as a Translog form as 
follows: 
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2 2
2
1 1ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
2 2
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
1
2
= + + + +
+ + +
+ + + −
it i K it L it KK it LL it
KL it it KT it LT it
T TT it it
Y K L K L
K L K T L T
T T V U
α β β γ γ
γ γ γ
δ δ
   (17)                       
1, 2,..... , 1, 2,..... ,  i N t T= =      
where Yit
 
is the level of output for the ith country in the tth time period and Kit and Lit 
indicate physical capital and labour respectively. T is a proxy for the exogenous 
technological progress. αi shows country specific effects and are introduced in the 
model to distinguish unobserved heterogeneity from the inefficiency component as in 
Greene (2005). Finally, itV
 
is a two sided error term, i.e. ),0(~ 2Vit NV σ
 
while
 
itU
 
is a 
non-negative, unobservable variable associated with the technical inefficiency of 
production, distributed as
 
( )it it iU g w U=
 
where itw  is a set of factors explaining 
technical inefficiency while |),(~| 2Uii NU σµ . Following Battese and Coelli (1995) 
the inefficiency effects are defined as:
  
ititii wUE ηαµ +== *)(     (18) 
Where wit
 
is a vector of explanatory variables we define latter on, α* is a (1×Μ) vector 
of parameters to be estimated while ηit
 
is a random variable. ηit
 
is assumed to
 
be 
independently distributed with mean zero and variance σ2 that is
 
),0(~ 2ση IDit  such 
that Uit is non-negative  (i.e. *αη itit w−≥ ). The vector wit includes aid flows (AIDit), 
the time trend (T) and the interaction product of the existing democracy level (DEMit) 
and aid flows (AIDitDEMit), i.e., wit = [AIDit, T, AIDitDEMit).
 
The production function (17) does not impose any restrictions on returns to scale and 
bias of technical progress. Differentiating equation (17) with respect to primary inputs 
of production, that is capital and labour, we get the output elasticity of the jth factor (j 
= K, L). 
)ln()ln()ln(
)ln(
itKLitKKK
it
it
K LKK
YE γγβ ++=∂
∂=  (19) 
)ln()ln()ln(
)ln(
itLKitLLL
it
it
L KLL
YE γγβ ++=∂
∂=  (20) 
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The rate of technical progress (TP) is obtained as: 
)ln()ln()ln( itLTitKTTTTit LKTT
YTP γγδδ +++=∂
∂=  (21) 
A feature of the Battese and Coelli (1995) model is that it assumes independence over 
time of the inefficiency terms. In other words, a country observed in two periods is 
treated as two different countries. However, maximum likelihood estimates of model 
(17) and (18) are still consistent as long as the distribution of each observation is 
correctly specified; see Alvarez et al. (2006).   
Battese and Coelli (1995) using the parameterization that replaces 2Vσ  and 2Uσ  
with 2 2 2 2 2, /  UU Vε εσ σ σ γ σ σ= + = , estimate equations (17) and (18) jointly by 
maximum likelihood. Parameter γ must lie between 0 and 1 and it shows the extent of 
technical inefficiency relative to random effects (two sided error term).  
Finally, Jondrow et al. (1982) have shown that measures of efficiency at country 
level can be obtained from the error terms ititit VU +=ε .  



Φ++=


)~(
)~(
~
1 2 it
it
it
it
it
w
w
w
UE φλ
λσ
ε
ε
 (22) 
where 
2
2 2 2 2
2,  ,  ,  an d  ε
ε ε
σ ε λσ = σ +σ λ = = − = −σ σ λ σ
i
i i
i
U it it
U V it it it
V
U
w w w
 
while
 
)~( itwφ  and 
)~( itwΦ
 
are the density and cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution respectively. For space reasons we report estimation results for the 
inefficiency equation and those for EK, EL, TP and TE. 
 
5. Data description and preliminary results  
Our estimations are based on annual observations of an unbalanced panel of 124 aid-
recipient countries (listed in the Data Appendix) for the period 1971-2007. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables at hand are given in Table B of the Data 
Appendix. We use panel techniques, which address partially the problem of missing 
unobserved time-invariant, country-specific characteristics. 
Our dataset includes levels of aid, real output, stock of physical capital, and 
employment. With the exception of aid, data come from the Heston, Summers and 
13 
 
Aten (2009) Penn World Table 6.3. The output series is GDP in constant 2005 I$ 
(chain series). The aggregate physical capital stock series was constructed using the 
perpetual inventory method. To avoid the problem of initial conditions, initial capital 
stocks were constructed for the year 1960 following Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993): 
we used the investment share of Real GDP per capita and population data available in 
PWT6.3 and we assumed a depreciation rate of 0.095 (see the Data Appendix for a 
detailed description of the methodology). The labour force series was constructed 
using real GDP (chain series) per worker, in 2005 I$. 
Regarding aid data, we use the standard measure provided by the OECD. These 
data correspond to Net Official Development Assistance from all donor countries 
(listed in the Data Appendix), and denote the net disbursement amount, i.e., 
disbursements minus amortisation, of those flows classified as Official Development 
Assistance. Official Development Assistance includes Grants or Loans to countries 
and territories on developing countries provided by official agencies, including state 
and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which 
meets the following three tests: (a) it is undertaken by the official sector; (b) it is 
administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as the main objective; and (c) it is given at concessional financial terms (if a 
loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent).9
Estimates of the production function and the underlying inefficiency equation are 
obtained by estimating jointly equations (17) and (18) via maximum likelihood. Table 
1 reports estimation results for the benchmark models that involve foreign aid and 
time and regional factors of inefficiency. For space reasons we report estimates for the 
inefficiency equation (17) as well as for output elasticities EK and EL, technical 
progress (TP) and technical efficiency (TE) evaluated at the sample mean.
 We employ disbursements (i.e. 
actual expenditures), instead of commitments and, following common practice, we 
scale aid data with the recipient’s GDP (denoted by AIDGDP), both measured in 
current US dollars. Data for GDP are drawn from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2009.  
10
                                                          
 
 
9
 In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and 
credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. 
pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted. 
 The 
10
 Estimates for the production function are available upon request.  
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results suggest that the elasticities of capital and labour do not vary significantly 
across model specifications and that the output elasticity of capital is higher than that 
of labour. Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) also report similar estimates for a panel 
sample of 65 countries over 1960-1999. The average worldwide technical progress is 
found to be positive for models (1) and (3) and negative for model (2) and statistically 
significant in all cases.11
γ
 Our findings also show that the one sided error term (U) 
dominates the symmetric error term (V); the relevant coefficient  approaches unity 
and is statistically significant. This means that the discrepancy between the observed 
output and the frontier output is almost completely due to technical inefficiency. The 
average level of technical efficiency ranges from almost 0.77 to 0.84. This means that 
the world output could increase further if inputs were used efficiently. Henry et al. 
(2009) report a value of technical efficiency close to 0.73.  
Column 1 of Table 1 shows that foreign aid is associated with greater production 
inefficiency. Following Temple (1999) we construct regional dummy variables to 
capture differences in the initial level of technology, instead of controlling for 
country-specific fixed effects. We thus segregate the sample and categorize countries 
into six broad regions: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South 
Asia (SA), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), following the World Bank geographic 
classification.12
                                                          
 
 
11
 Kneller and Stevens (2003) and Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) report counter-intuitive 
negative rates of technical progress, whereas Christopoulos and León-Ledesma (2009) find 
evidence of positive technological progress. Henry et al. (2009) also find negative trend 
effects, but they consider the contribution of foreign R&D, making overall technical progress 
positive. 
 Column 2 shows that, with the exception of Latin America and 
Caribbean, foreign aid increases production inefficiency in all regions, and this 
inefficiency effect is considerably larger for South Asia, Sub-Saharan and North 
Africa and oil-rich Middle-East countries. This finding is in line with Djankov et al. 
(2008) who show that foreign aid results in the same curse as that of natural resources 
where institution quality is severely undermined by rent seeking activities. Next, to 
capture any time effects that might be associated with these changes we add decade 
12
 From the 124 countries of our sample, 36% belong to Sub-Saharan Africa, 24% to Latin 
America, 16% to Middle East and North Africa, 6% to South Asia and 2% to Europe. Notice 
that, since our entire sample comprises only developing countries, the production frontier we 
measure is not necessarily the global frontier. 
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time effects as in Rajan and Subramanian (2008). Interestingly, estimation results 
reported in column 3 of Table 1 show that the positive inefficiency effect of aid is 
increasing over time with the highest effect observed in the last decade.  
Using a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), Henry et al. (2009) show that 
international trade, and particularly imports of machinery products, is an important 
channel through which both technology transfers and production efficiency affect 
developing countries’ output level. To investigate whether the efficiency impact of aid 
depends on the targeting sectors of the recipient country we discriminate between aid 
for social infrastructure and services (SIS), aid for economic infrastructure and 
services (EI), and aid for production sectors (PS), following the disaggregation 
argument of Clemens et al. (2004). A detailed listing of the sectors and subsectors of 
each category is provided in the Data Appendix. Data are again drawn from the 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database provided by the OECD.13
As a next step, we discriminate between multilateral aid (aid transferred by 
alliances of multiple states) and bilateral aid (aid transferred from one single state to 
another) on the basis that the economic effectiveness of aid may be constrained by the 
strategic motivations of bilateral donors due to failed conditionality or aid 
misallocation; that is, to the extent that donors are concerned with achieving 
geopolitical rather than developmental objectives, their incentive to hold the recipient 
government accountable for the effective use of aid receipts is weakened. On the other 
 Column 1 of 
Table 2 reports the estimates and shows that aid for social infrastructure (i.e., aid for 
education, health, water supply and civil society) and aid for production purposes 
(targeting, among others, the agricultural, industrial, and construction sector) 
increases production inefficiency, although the estimated coefficient for the latter 
category is statistically significant at 10% level. Interestingly, aid related to economic 
infrastructure sectors (like transport, communications, energy and banking) exerts a 
statistically insignificant inefficiency effect.    
                                                          
 
 
13
 We employ data for aid commitments which are available for the period under investigation 
and we convert commitments to real disbursements following the methodology suggested by 
Clemens et al. (2004): we multiply the share of aid commitments in total commitments with 
total aid disbursements, thereby assuming that the measurable commitments ratio is roughly 
equal to the unmeasurable disbursements ratio. Clemens et al. (2004) compare these estimates 
to actual disbursements data for 1990 onwards to find that calculated values are very close to 
real ones. 
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hand, since bilateral aid is often used by the donors as a tool of securing their 
political, military or economic interests, we expect this form of transfers to benefit 
less, if not impair, growth in the recipient country, as compared with multilateral aid 
that is presumed to have diluted donor control and neutralized ulterior motives. To 
reconsider the bilateral-multilateral dichotomy in a production theory context we draw 
aid data from the OECD database scaled with the recipient’s GDP (source: WDI 
2009). Column 2 of Table 2 reports these estimates and shows that, as expected, only 
strategically motivated bilateral aid increases production inefficiency.14
 
 This finding 
is in contrast with Ram (2003) who reports that bilateral aid has very strong growth 
effects when outliers are removed, whereas multilateral aid has either a non-
statistically significant effect, or a massive negative effect, but both results can be 
attributed to reverse causation as the author makes no allowances for the endogeneity 
of aid. Controlling for this endogeneity, Rajan and Subramanian (2008) find that 
multilateral aid is just as ineffective as bilateral aid. Overall, we reveal that foreign aid 
is not only immaterial for local growth, as previous studies have show, but also that it 
contributes positively in an inefficient use of the production inputs that are available 
in the local economy. We next consider if this inefficiency contribution depends on 
the political organization of the recipient government. 
6. Main empirical results 
In this section we report estimation results that link aid and production inefficiency 
with political reforms (section 6.1), their timing (section 6.2) and their intensity 
(section 6.3).  
 
6.1. Political reforms, aid and production efficiency 
To capture political reforms we rely on three different datasets and code them as a 
binary variable: democratic transitions taken from Papaioannou and Siourounis 
(2008a, PS hereafter), Polity IV democracy measure; and Freedom House ratings of 
political rights and civil liberties. 
PS dataset: The authors denote a democratic (or autocratic) transition by taking into 
account sudden changes in the aforementioned measures of democracy, the timing of 
                                                          
 
 
14
 Notice that the estimate of technical progress is positive for this regression. 
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free and fair elections, and whether a five-year stability condition is satisfied.15
Polity IV measure: The next dataset we employ is the composite Polity index 
described in Marshall and Jaggers (2004). This index ranges from −10 to +10 , with 
higher values indicating higher levels of political freedom, and it captures the degree 
of competitiveness in political participation, the extent of openness in the selection of 
the legislature, and the checks and balances on executive power. A fully democratic 
government has three essential elements according to the Polity index: fully 
competitive political participation, institutionalized constraints on executive power, 
and guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in political 
participation. A regime change is detected when the 21-range Polity measure jumps 
from a negative to a positive value and remains there for five years.
 This 
coding alleviates some of the serious problems often met when measuring democracy, 
like mismeasurement, exact timing, stability of the reform and acceptance of the new 
regime. It also covers more countries and more years than any other available 
democracy measurement. Based on PS dataset we construct a dummy variable that 
equals zero before the transition year and one during the transition and in the 
following years (denoted by PS1). Table 3, Column 1 reports the estimated 
coefficients for both aid and the interaction of aid with this reform variable. 
Surprisingly enough, not only democratization reduces production inefficiency by a 
statistically significant amount but, more importantly, the size of this reduction offsets 
almost entirely the inefficiency increase induced by aid. Thus, the model prediction 
on the differential effect of aid in democracies is empirically validated. 
16
. We construct a 
dummy variable that equals zero before the transition year and one during the 
transition and in the following years (denoted by Pol1). This dataset resembles 
qualitatively that of PS but covers 12 countries less (see Table A in the Appendix).17
                                                          
 
 
15
  For more details on the index see Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a). 
 
Table 3, Column 2 reports the estimates where again the interaction of aid with 
permanent democratization episodes is not only negative and statistically significant, 
but also sizable enough to overturn the positive inefficiency effect of aid. Thus, the 
16
 See also Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a). 
17
 These are: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brunei, Cape Verde, Dominica, Grenada, Malta, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Suriname and Tonga. 
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empirical evidence on the differential effect of aid remains intact when we employ 
alternative measures of democracy thereby validating the model prediction.  
Freedom House Indices: Freedom House (FH) democracy measure consists of an 
evaluation of civil liberties protection, such as freedom of speech, association, 
assembly and demonstration, and political rights protection, such as the right for free 
and fair elections that represent informed citizen preferences. Scores for political 
rights and civil liberties range from 1 to 7 with lower values indicating more 
democracy. Countries with an average score of political rights and civil liberties less 
than 2.5 are assigned "free", while those with a greater than 5.5 score are designated 
as "not free"; countries with an average score between 2.5 and 5.5 are designated 
"partly free". Notice that, using this dataset to code transitions is not without problems 
since these scores move very slowly failing to capture considerable changes in the 
political organization of countries, whereas the stability criterion is difficult to be 
implemented. In addition, Muck and Verkuilen (2002) have shown that Freedom 
House evaluation methods are biased against left-wing governments, socialist regimes 
and countries not open to international trade. We nevertheless code a regime change 
when the FH status characterization jumps from Not Free to either Free or Partly Free 
and from Partly Free to Free provided that the index remains at the new regime status 
for five years. We then construct a dummy variable that equals zero before the 
transition year and one during the transition and in the following years (denoted by 
FH1). Table 3, Column 3 reports the results which show that, although with the 
correct sign, reforms captured by this measure do not affect the positive inefficiency 
impact of aid.  
Table C of the Appendix ranks countries according to technical efficiency 
estimated using PS1 dummy variable to capture political reforms. Given the amount 
and combination of inputs used, the estimated efficiency values indicate how much 
GDP a country “produces” as a portion of the GDP that would have been possible to 
produce had the country in question been on the best practice frontier, i.e. had it been 
efficient. The top five most efficient countries are Sao Tome and Principe, Namibia, 
Libya, Vietnam and Tanzania, whereas at the bottom of the efficiency list we find 
Guinea-Bissau, Singapore, Lebanon, Somalia and Kuwait. 
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6.2. Timing of reforms, aid and production efficiency 
It is important to know if the production inefficiency reduction induced by the 
interaction of aid with the reform variable is monotonic. Some countries move to 
democracy without considerable transaction costs, whereas others experience 
considerable turmoil. In essence, aid distribution might improve immediately in the 
former case whereas it can delay considerably in the latter. To time the effect of the 
reform we construct dummy variables for four non-overlapping, three-year spaced 
periods around the reform date that help capture short to medium-run effects and one 
dummy variable to isolate the long run effect. In turn, the inefficiency equation (18) 
for the preferred PS reform dataset becomes: 
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
( )i
it it it it it it it it it it it it it
E U
a AID T AID D AID D AID D AID D AID Dβ β β β β β β η
=
+ + + + + + + +
 
where 1 1itD =  in the fifth, fourth and third pre-reform year; 2 1itD =  in the second and 
first pre-reform year and at the transition year; 3 1itD =  in the first, second and third 
post-reform year; 4 1itD =  the fourth, fifth and sixth post-reform years; and 5 1itD =  in 
the seventh and all subsequent post-reform years. So, the base period is the autocratic 
years before the 5th pre-reform year. Table 4, Columns 1-3, report the estimated 
coefficients. From those, only the ones that are estimated with the PS and Polity 
dataset are significant.  
Anticipation and transition: The dummy variable D1 captures any anticipation effects. 
It is possible that the ruling elite implements better and wider distribution policies in 
an attempt to gain legitimacy and remain in power. Using the PS dataset, estimates 
show that the interaction of D1 with aid is considerably large and even outweights the 
positive inefficiency effect of aid, thereby strengthening our overall argument that 
political governance is very significant in the way aid is distributed, monitored and 
used. Evidently, due to anticipation effect foreign aid increases production efficiency 
in the 5th, 4th and 3rd pre-reform year. Turning to the transition dummy, D2, we see 
that although the interaction effect is negative, it is indistinguishable from zero. The 
same is true when we use the Polity IV dataset. 
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Short to medium-term effects: The estimated coefficients for the interaction terms with 
D3 and D4 are also negative, but not statistically significant pointing to considerable 
transition costs that do not allow any positive effects of aid on production efficiency. 
This result implies that, in several cases it might be better to restrain foreign aid for 
some time until the local government has established itself, as opposed to recent 
studies which show that foreign aid exerts a 3-4 years impact in economic 
performance. Conditional on political reforms, we find that the period when aid seems 
to start playing a role is beyond 6 years. That period’s end seems to coincide with D5, 
whose interaction with aid is significantly negative and sizable.  
Long-term effects: The most important result is that of the coefficient of D5. Notice 
that this coefficient is not only significant (using both the PS and the Polity datasets) 
but its magnitude is large enough to render the overall efficiency effect of aid positive. 
It shows that as democracy consolidates, representative governance is able to better 
handle foreign aid, something that reduces considerably production inefficiency 
present from the former type of governance. 
To illustrate the conditional time-varying effectiveness of aid we recover the 
corresponding inefficiency elasticities, calculated at different time intervals around 
the PS1 reform, and we provide a graphical presentation. Notice that, these elasticities 
correspond to inefficiency changes incurred as a result of a one-unit increase in 
average aid. As shown in Graph 1, aid is mostly conductive to production efficiency 
in the fifth, fourth and third year prior to the reform; for this time interval the 
inefficiency reduction is the greater in absolute value (−0.08). Yet, this effect vanishes 
gradually as the reform approaches. At the time of the reform and during the three 
post-reform years aid produces production inefficiency for the reasons explained 
above. Finally, after the fourth post-reform year aid fosters production efficiency 
again; the inefficiency elasticity reached almost −0.06 . This graphical illustration 
shows that foreign aid induces production efficiency early before the reform and after 
the reform has established in the recipient country. 
 
6.3. Intensity of reforms, aid and production efficiency 
So far we have examined how the incidence and the timing of democratic reforms can 
offset the positive inefficiency impact of aid. Another potential factor is the intensity 
of the reforms. The intensity of reforms might have differential effects in the political 
organization of a country with important implications for the effectiveness of aid. 
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Sudden changes in the political leadership may foster aid effectiveness if, for instance, 
the replacement of a corrupt or expropriate leadership by a democratic one is followed 
by a distinctly different and more effective distribution policy of aid. On the other 
hand, local autocratic leaders may allow some resources to be distributed in a more 
egalitarian way if they are subject to internal or international pressure and the 
marginal effect of the reform is large. To investigate if the effectiveness of aid 
depends on the intensity of the political reforms we code countries into two 
categories: fully democratized and partially democratized. For Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2008a) dataset we use the authors’ classification. For Polity IV, fully 
democratized countries are those that scored at least +7 after democratization, 
whereas partially democratized countries are those that scored 0 to +6 after 
democratization. For Freedom House, we use the existing characterizations after 
democratization episodes. Estimation results are reported in Table 5, Columns 1-3. As 
can be readily seen, all coefficients for the interaction terms of aid with the reform 
variables are negative, but only the interactions of aid with partial reforms are 
statistically significant across estimations. This finding provides strong evidence that 
the inefficiency effect of aid is moderated in recipients that have experienced partial 
democratization episodes. Interestingly, estimation results of columns 1 and 2 show 
that a partial move to democratic ruling has a significantly negative effect on 
production inefficiency that is moreover sizeable enough to overturn the positive 
effect of aid. Using the preferred PS reform dataset, we find evidence that recipient 
countries that have moved to partial democratic ruling enjoy an inefficiency reduction 
due to the reform that is not experienced by countries that have moved to full 
democratic governance. This result is in accordance with Papaioannou and Siourounis 
(2008a) who find that partial democratizations assert a higher impact in long run 
growth and Barro (1996, 1997) who shows that growth accelerates when a country 
moves from total autocracy to intermediate levels of political freedom. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the aid literature by investigating the impact of aid on the 
production inefficiency of the recipient countries. This relationship has received 
considerably little attention by theorists and empirical researchers who have mainly 
focused on the growth implications of aid, giving rise to a huge literature of 
inconclusive results. As opposed to economic growth, production efficiency 
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corresponds to the efficient use of the existing production inputs and is of great 
importance for aid-recipient countries as, in the majority of them, technological 
progress –that could alternatively foster productivity– is very slow.  
We document that foreign is associated with greater production inefficiency, 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the time horizon, and the sources of aid. 
Moreover, our analysis goes further by exploring whether the political orientation of 
the recipient country alters the positive relationship between the aid flows received 
and the production inefficiency estimated. To this end, we present a theoretical 
framework to describe the channels of aid effectiveness which lies in the realistic 
assumption that a part of a recipient economy’s output is produced in the inefficient 
informal sector. Foreign aid acts on the production efficiency of the economy by 
increasing the relative size of the efficient formal sector. Yet, foreign aid is managed 
by the ruling class within a certain political environment and, therefore, any 
mismanagement of these resources has important implications for their economic 
effectiveness. In line with the model prediction, we provide strong empirical evidence 
that the quality of institutions, captured by the political orientation of the recipient 
country, matter. Production inefficiency caused by the misuse of aid reduces 
significantly if the political regime of the recipient switches to democratic ruling as 
the latter is often associated with increased political accountability and moderate 
corruption levels. In practice, democratic ruling enables the ruling elite to adopt long-
term policies that are less extractive and result in a better allocation of foreign aid 
thereby increasing production efficiency.  
Moreover, we find empirical evidence that the differential effect of aid is not 
monotonic with respect to the time of the democratic reform; in the 5th, 4th and 3rd pre-
reform year aid has a strong effect in inefficiency reduction which diminishes 
significantly by the 4th, 5th and 6th year after democratization to pick up again 
afterwards. This result pinpoints the importance of anticipation and long-run effects in 
determining the effectiveness of aid flows. Finally, we investigate the intensity of 
democratic reforms and we recover that moderate but stable political changes towards 
democracy bolster production inefficiency reductions in the presence of aid more than 
abrupt political transitions.  
We see this work as a contribution to the ongoing research on the prerequisites that 
aid recipient countries need to have in order to benefit themselves from long-term 
improvement in production efficiency, output growth and standards of living. 
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Table 1: Foreign Aid (% of GDP) and Production Efficiency 
 
 Inefficiency Equation 
 (1) (2) (3)  
     
tCons tan  -1.407** 
[0.035] 
0.745*** 
[0.001] 
-1.610* 
[0.069] 
 
AID  0.229*** 
[0.003] 
   
Time  -0.129*** 
[0.001] 
-0.041**** 
[0.001] 
-0.121*** 
[0.001] 
 
*AID Time  0.002* 
[0.056] 
   
*AID EAP   0.007*** 
[0.001] 
  
*AID ECA   0.006*** 
[0.001] 
  
*AID LAC   -0.003 
[0.462] 
  
*AID MENA   0.010*** 
[0.001] 
  
*AID SA   0.018*** 
[0.001] 
  
*AID SSA   0.014*** 
[0.001] 
  
*(1971 1979)AID −    0.052*** 
[0.008] 
 
*(1980 1989)AID −    0.034*** 
[0.007] 
 
*(1990 1999)AID −    0.064*** 
[0.001] 
 
*(2000 2007)AID −    0.085*** 
[0.001] 
 
     
22
2
vU
U
σσ
σγ +=  
0.991*** 
[0.001] 
0.957*** 
[0.001] 
0.991*** 
[0.001] 
 
222
VU σσσ +=  0.648*** [0.003] 0.079*** [0.001] 0.658*** [0.001]  
     
KE  0.376*** [0.001] 
0.416*** 
[0.001] 
0.376*** 
[0.001] 
 
LE  0.238*** [0.001] 
0.297*** 
[0.001] 
0.235*** 
[0.001] 
 
TE  0.843 0.766 0.843  
TP  0.006*** 
[0.001] 
-0.009*** 
[0.001] 
0.006*** 
[0.001] 
 
 
No of countries 124 124 124  
 
Notes: Estimation method is Maximum Likelihood. Production Function estimates are not reported foe 
space reasons but are available from the authors upon request. *, **, *** correspond to statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. For each independent variable the first row provides the 
estimates of regression coefficients whereas figures in brackets are p-values. EK and EL denote the 
elasticity of capital and labour with respect to output respectively while TP and TE denote Technical 
Progress and Technical Efficiency respectively. EK, EL, TP and TE are evaluated at the sample mean.  
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Table 2: Disaggregated Foreign Aid (% of GDP) and Production Efficiency 
 
 Inefficiency Equation 
 (1) (2) 
   
tCons tan  -1.658 
[0.109] 
-140.886 
[0.100] 
Time  -0.104** 
[0.015] 
-2.578** 
[0.012] 
SIS  0.087*** 
[0.008] 
 
EI  0.026 
[0.137] 
 
PS  0.026* 
[0.078] 
 
 Multilateral Aid   0.100 
[0.152] 
 Bilateral Aid   0.046*** 
[0.006] 
   
22
2
vU
U
σσ
σγ +=  
0.993*** 
[0.001] 
0.991*** 
[0.001] 
222
VU σσσ +=  0.522** [0.025] 
39.85** 
[0.025] 
KE  0.482*** [0.001] 
0.400*** 
[0.001] 
LE  0.439*** [0.001] 
0.264*** 
[0.001] 
TE  0.869 0.820 
TP  -0.0003 
[0.784] 
0.006*** 
[0.001] 
No of countries 118 118 
       
Notes: See Table 1. 
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Table 3: Aid, Production Efficiency and Permanent Political Reforms 
 
 Inefficiency Equation 
 (1) (2) (3)  
     
tCons tan  0.644*** 
[0.001] 
0.021 
[0.651] 
-4.800 
[0.264] 
 
AID  0.012*** 
[0.001] 
0.013*** 
[0.001] 
0.108*** 
[0.001] 
 
Time  -0.045*** 
[0.001] 
-0.018*** 
[0.001] 
-0.189 
[0.235] 
 
* _ 1AID EV PS  -0.011** 
[0.013] 
   
* _ 1AID EV POL   -0.013*** 
[0.001] 
  
* _ 1AID EV FH    -0.797 
[0.264] 
 
     
22
2
vU
U
σσ
σγ +=  
0.999*** 
[0.001] 
0.999*** 
[0.001] 
0.995*** 
[0.001] 
 
222
VU σσσ +=  0.113*** [0.001] 0.151*** [0.001] 0.249*** [0.001]  
KE  0.421*** [0.001] 
0.389*** 
[0.001] 
0.411*** 
[0.001] 
 
LE  0.103** [0.040] 
0.199** 
[0.050] 
0.133*** 
[0.010] 
 
TE  0.768 0.801 0.860  
TP  -0.004 
[0.795] 
0.010*** 
[0.001] 
0.010*** 
[0.001] 
 
No of countries 114 102 102  
 
Notes: See Table 1. 
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Table 4. Aid, Production Efficiency and Political Timing of Political Reforms 
 
 Inefficiency Equation 
 (1) (2) (3)  
     
tCons tan  0.610*** 
[0.001] 
0.586*** 
[0.001] 
-3.296 
[0.150] 
 
AID  0.012*** 
[0.001] 
0.013*** 
[0.001] 
0.075** 
[0.014] 
 
Time  -0.039*** 
[0.001] 
-0.038*** 
[0.001] 
-0.078* 
[0.070] 
 
* 1AID D  -0.024*** 
[0.008] 
   
* 2AID D  -0.012* 
[0.062] 
   
* 3AID D  -0.007 
[0.260] 
   
* 4AID D  -0.016 
[0.104] 
   
* 5AID D  -0.023** 
[0.044] 
   
* 1_AID D POL   -0.011*** 
[0.001] 
  
* 2 _AID D POL   -0.010** 
[0.038] 
  
* 3_AID D POL   -0.013*** 
[0.001] 
  
* 4 _AID D POL   -0.012* 
[0.053] 
  
* 5_AID D POL   -0.015*** 
[0.001] 
  
* 1_AID D FH    -0.098* 
[0.082] 
 
* 2 _AID D FH    -0.0173 
[0.154] 
 
* 3_AID D FH    -0.234 
[0.203] 
 
* 4 _AID D FH    -0.560 
[0.217] 
 
* 5_AID D FH    -0.192 
[0.240] 
 
22
2
vU
U
σσ
σγ +=  
0.997*** 
[0.001] 
0.996*** 
[0.001] 
0.996*** 
[0.001] 
 
222
VU σσσ +=  0.102*** [0.001] 0.097*** [0.001] 0.703*** [0.001]  
KE  0.427*** [0.001] 
0.403*** 
[0.001] 
0.436*** 
[0.001] 
 
LE  0.204 [0.100] 
0.187*** 
[0.001] 
0.302*** 
[0.001] 
 
TE  0.767 0.771 0.864  
TP  -0.003*** 
[0.004] 
-0.009 
[0.860] 
0.006*** 
[0.001] 
 
No of countries 90 85 85  
 Notes: See Table 1. 
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Table 5: Aid, Production Efficiency and Political Intensity of Political Reforms 
 
 
 Inefficiency Equation  
 (1) (2) (3)  
     
tCons tan  0.632*** 
[0.001] 
0.633*** 
[0.001] 
0.305*** 
[0.001] 
 
AID  0.014*** 
[0.001] 
0.016*** 
[0.001] 
0.018*** 
[0.001] 
 
Time  -0.046*** 
[0.001] 
-0.044*** 
[0.001] 
-0.041*** 
[0.001] 
 
* _AID D FUL  -0.049 
[0.240] 
   
* _AID D PARTIAL  -0.015*** 
[0.001] 
   
* _ _AID D FUL POL   -0.019*** 
[0.001] 
  
* _ _AID D PARTIAL POL   -0.099*** 
[0.001] 
  
* _ _AID D FUL FH    -0.046 
[0.551] 
 
* _ _AID D PARTIAL FH    -0.010*** 
[0.001] 
 
     
     
22
2
vU
U
σσ
σγ +=  
0.997*** 
[0.001] 
0.997*** 
[0.001] 
0.998*** 
[0.001] 
 
222
VU σσσ +=  0.120*** [0.001] 0.112*** [0.001] 0.162*** [0.001]  
     
KE  0.407*** [0.001] 
0.392*** 
[0.001] 
0.393*** 
[0.001] 
 
LE  0.112*** [0.029] 
0.049 
[0.501] 
0.049 
[0.564] 
 
TE  0.764 0.766 0.794  
TP  0.004 
[0.850] 
0.029 
[0.218] 
0.007*** 
[0.002] 
 
No of countries 114 102 102  
 
Notes: See Table 1. 
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Data Appendix 
 
Country coverage – Aid Recipients 
 
Sample (124 countries): 
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, 
Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Dem. 
Rep., Congo, Rep., Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’ Ivoire, Cyprus, Djibouti, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Macao, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, St.Vincent 
& Gredines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Yemen. 
 
 
Disaggregated data of aid  
 
A. Bilateral vs. Multilateral Aid: 
Bilateral aid includes aid from the 22 Development Assistance Committee member 
countries defined in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
database. These are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United 
States.  
 
Multilateral aid is identified in the OECD’s DAC database and includes assistance 
from the World Bank, and the regional development banks. These are: African 
Development Bank (AfDB), African Development Fund (AfDF), Asian Development 
Fund (AsDF), Asian Development Bank (AsDB), Caribbean Development Bank 
(CarDB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European 
Commission (EC), Global Environment Facility (GEF), Global Fund for AIDS, TB 
and Malaria (GFATM), Montreal Protocol, Nordic Development Fund, International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development 
Association (IDA), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), IDB Spec. Fund, IMF 
Trust Fund, IMF, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA), United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTA), World Food Programme 
(WFP), Council of Europe, Arab Agencies, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, 
Poland, Slovak Republic, Turkey, and Arab Countries. 
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B. Sectoral coverage of aid flows:  
Aid for social infrastructure and services (as % of GDP) includes assistance for the 
following sub-sectors: 
I.1. Education 
I.1.a. Education, Level Unspecified 
I.1.b. Basic Education 
I.1.c. Secondary Education 
I.1.d. Post-Secondary Education 
I.2. Health 
I.2.a. Health, General 
I.2.b. Basic Health 
I.3. Population Pol./Progr. & Reproductive Health 
I.4. Water Supply & Sanitation 
I.5. Government & Civil Society 
I.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general 
I.5.b. Conflict, Peace & Security 
I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services 
Aid for economic infrastructure and services (as % of GDP) includes assistance for 
the following sub-sectors:  
II.1. Transport & Storage 
II.2. Communications 
II.3. Energy 
II.4. Banking & Financial Services 
II.5. Business & Other Services 
Aid for production sectors (as % of GDP) includes assistance for the following sub-
sectors:  
III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
III.1.a. Agriculture 
III.1.b. Forestry 
III.1.c. Fishing 
III.2. Industry, Mining, Construction 
III.2.a. Industry 
III.2.b. Mineral Resources & Mining 
III.2.c. Construction 
III.3.a. Trade Policies & Regulations 
III.3.b. Tourism 
Data on each category of aid are in terms of commitments. Conversion to 
disbursements was made by taking the ratio of commitments in each sector to overall 
commitments and then multiplying this amount by aggregate aid disbursements. 
 
Physical capital data construction: Estimates of the physical capital stock are 
generated using the perpetual inventory method and the pair of equations:  
( ) ( )01 1 01 , ,it it it i K
IK K I K
g− −
= − ∆ + = + ∆   
where K refers to the physical capital stock, Δ is the depreciation rate, I stands for 
investment and gK denotes the average annual growth rate of investment over the 
sample period. To overcome the problems regarding the assumptions about initial 
capital stocks, this value was estimated for the first available observation. The 
depreciation rate was set equal to 9.50 percent.  
Appendix Table A: Country sample 
 
Panel A: Preferred Sample: Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008)   
114 Countries  
Panel B:  Polity IV 
102 countries 
Panel C: Freedom House 
113 countries 
Full 
Democratization 
Partial 
Democratization Always Authoritarian 
Borderline and 
Reversals  Always Democratic  
Full and Partial 
Democratization 
Always 
Authoritarian 
Full and Partial 
Democratization 
Always 
Authoritarian 
             
Argentina (1983) Bangladesh (1991) Algeria Jordan Borderline     Panel A minus: Panel A minus: 
Benin (1991) Djibouti (1999)  Angola  Kenya    Israel   
  
Bolivia (1982) Ethiopia (1995) U. Arab 
Emirates  
Kuwait  Central African  
Republic (1993) 
 Bahamas   Bahamas Sao Tome and Principe 
Brazil (1985) Guatemala (1996) Bahrain Laos    Jamaica  Barbados   
Cape Verde (1991) Indonesia (1999) Barbados Liberia  Comoros (1990)      
 
  
Chile (1990) Lesotho (1993) Bhutan  Libya       Belize   
Dom.  Rep.  (1978) Madagascar (1993) Brunei  Mauritania Iran  (1997)  Belize       
Ecuador (1979) Malawi (1994) Burkina Faso Morocco Nepal (1991)  Botswana Malta  Brunei   
El Salvador (1994) Mozambique (1994) Burundi Oman Niger (1999)   Mauritius      
Ghana (1996) Nicaragua (1990) Cambodia Qatar  Pakistan (1988)  Colombia Namibia  Cape Verde   
Grenada (1984) Nigeria (1999) Cameroon Rwanda   Costa Rica       
Guyana (1992) Paraguay (1993) Chad Saudi Arabia    Cyprus   Dominica   
Honduras (1982) Suriname (1991)  China Sierra Leone          
Korea, Rep. (1988) Tanzania (1995) Congo, Dem.   Singapore Reversals  Dominica Papua 
New 
Guinea 
 Grenada   
Mali (1992) Turkey (1983) Congo, Rep. Somalia Gambia (1994)  Fiji   Malta   
Mexico (1997) Zambia (1991) Egypt Syria Lebanon (1975)   Sri Lanka      
Mongolia (1993)  Equatorial 
Guinea  
Sudan  Zimbabwe 
(1987) 
    
Sao Tome and Principe 
  
Panama (1994)  Gabon Swaziland     Trinidad 
& Tobago 
 
Seychelles 
  
Peru (1980)  Guinea Togo Intermediate         
Philippines (1987)  Guinea-Bissau Tunisia   India   Suriname   
Sao Tome and 
Principe (1991)  
 Haiti Uganda Malaysia   Venezuela      
Senegal (2000)  Iraq  Vietnam  Tonga     Tonga   
Thailand (1992)  Seychelles           
Uruguay (1985)             
             
Panel A gives the base sample countries. Panels B and C report the differences in countries according to PolityIV and Freedom House respectively from our preferred sample. According to Papaioannou and Siourounis 
(2008a), there are seven categories. (1) “Always authoritarian” are those countries that are autocratic throughout the sample period. (2) The “full” democratization group includes countries that abandoned autocratic ruling 
in the period 1960-2005 and in addition get an almost perfect score in civil rights and political liberties protection. (3) The “partial” democratization group includes countries that abandoned autocracy in the period 1960-
2005, but the level of civil rights protection is not perfect. (4) “Borderline democratization” countries implemented political reforms towards democratic rule, but civil liberties and freedoms are still at a very low level. (5) 
“Always democratic” countries are throughout the sample period democratically ruled. (6) “Intermediate” countries get a far from perfect democratic score but have not experienced a regime change.  (7) “Reversals” 
indicate countries that experienced a political set-back, moving from a relatively stable democracy to autocratic status. The year of transition is given in parenthesis. Section 2 of the authors’ paper provides details on their 
algorithm in grouping countries and identifying political transitions.  
  
Appendix Table B. Descriptive statistics on inputs and outputs 
 Sample: 124 countries, 1971-2007 
 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
AIDGDP (%) 7.40 10.16 -2.76 108.3 
Aid for Social Infrastructure 3.67 6.31 0.00 91.59 
Aid for Economic Infrastructure 2.66 4.21 0.00 60.19 
Aid for Production Sectors 2.31 3.94 0.00 56.82 
Multilateral Aid 26.14 40.76 -36.80 491.87 
    
Bilateral Aid 69.44 126.47 -175.76 1837.23 
Capital per worker 0.04 0.11 0.00 1.31 
GDP per worker 18,689.09 27,978.74 413.20 317,528.50 
Labour (thousands) 13,882.33 64,441.14 24.087 785,714.50 
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Appendix Table C. Countries ranked by technical efficiency (TE) 
(Average values for the entire 1971-2007 sample period, 114 countries – 3,283 observations) 
 
 Country  TE  Country  TE  Country  TE 
 Sao Tome & Principe 0.965  Honduras 0.808  Seychelles 0.726 
 Namibia 0.925  Iran 0.807  Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.724 
 Libya 0.909  Bolivia 0.807  Trinidad and Tobago 0.723 
 Vietnam 0.899  Comoros 0.805  Sierra Leone 0.723 
 Tanzania 0.899  Burundi 0.804  Swaziland 0.722 
 Tonga 0.898  Togo 0.803  Cyprus               0.719 
 Argentina 0.887  Fiji 0.799  Congo, Rep. 0.716 
 Laos 0.878  Paraguay 0.799  Indonesia 0.714 
 Algeria 0.873  Uruguay 0.798  Benin 0.714 
 Guinea 0.868  Peru 0.797  Uganda 0.707 
 Lesotho 0.861  Saudi Arabia 0.794  Panama 0.704 
 Philippines 0.860  Jamaica 0.793  Qatar 0.702 
 Cambodia 0.858  Niger 0.793  Syria 0.699 
 Haiti 0.857  Morocco 0.791  Tunisia 0.699 
 Djibouti 0.856  Brunei 0.789  Bhutan 0.697 
 Nepal 0.856  Jordan 0.787  Egypt 0.696 
 Central African Rep. 0.853  Angola 0.786  Mali 0.693 
 Guatemala 0.850  Chad 0.782  Malaysia 0.683 
 Senegal 0.848  Guyana 0.779  Liberia 0.683 
 Barbados 0.847  Nicaragua 0.777  Korea 0.683 
 Mauritius 0.840  Cape Verde 0.776  Mauritania 0.682 
 Ethiopia 0.838  Bahrain 0.775  Thailand 0.680 
 Bangladesh 0.837  Mongolia 0.774  Sudan 0.675 
 Zambia 0.837  Cameroon 0.773  Oman 0.667 
 Ecuador 0.836  Madagascar 0.772  Botswana 0.661 
 Bahamas 0.835  Pakistan 0.769  Malawi 0.645 
 Mexico 0.835  China 0.769  Nigeria 0.630 
 Belize 0.833  Grenada 0.766  Equatorial Guinea 0.630 
 El Salvador 0.833  Burkina Faso 0.766  Iraq 0.627 
 Rwanda 0.832  Ghana 0.759  Guinea-Bissau 0.615 
 Mozambique 0.828  Malta 0.756  Singapore 0.577 
 Brazil 0.822  Sri Lanka 0.754  Lebanon 0.574 
 Venezuela 0.817  United Arab Emirates 0.753  Somalia 0.535 
 Dominica 0.817  Zimbabwe 0.752  Kuwait 0.497 
 Surime 0.816  Papua New Guinea 0.746 
 Colombia 0.814  Gabon 0.745 
 Turkey 0.812  Kenya 0.744 
 India 0.811  Dominican Republic 0.739 
 Costa Rica 0.811  Israel 0.731 
 Gambia 0.810  Chile 0.729 
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Graph 1:  
Production Inefficiency Change due to Aid and Timing of Reform  
 
 
Years around the democratic reform (t) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
